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Abstract 
The success of the integration process of the new EU Member States is reflected by their nominal and 
real convergence performance. These tendencies are of special importance considering further 
enlargement of the Eurozone. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 has resulted, however, in a 
fundamentally new situation as regards these issues. 
The paper considers the experiences gained in real convergence, the catch-up processes and their future 
prospects. As for nominal convergence, only those factors were analysed which affect real convergence 
directly. In particular, the analysis focuses on the sustainability of the convergence processes. 
The possible trends of longer term growth and convergence processes are presented based on a 
qualitative analysis representing the supply side approach.3 The analysis is aimed at revealing potential – 
not insignificant – risks and threats. 
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1. Real and nominal convergence 
1.1. New challenges of convergence during the crisis 
The potential advantages of adopting the euro are of great importance for new 
Member States (NMSs). Euro adoption can contribute positively to long term growth 
and stability. It has an impact on economic performance through several macro- and 
microeconomic channels: the stability-oriented macroeconomic framework, access to 
liquid markets, more trade and foreign direct investment, lower transaction costs and 
increased competition. 
Indeed, Eurozone membership has to be assessed in a broader context when 
considering it from the point of view of economic policy. The static view on the state of 
nominal convergence is not enough (Angeloni, Flad and Mongelli (2007)). In order to 
take full advantage of the single currency - taking into consideration the restrictions of 
the common monetary policy and irrevocably fixed exchange rate – the economic policy 
needs to ensure the proper functioning of the internal adjustment mechanism safeguarding 
stability. Adequate labour- and product market flexibility, as well as sufficient fiscal 
buffers were identified as the preconditions of successful euro adoption (Rybinski 
(2007), Darvas and Szapáry (2008)). Closer economic integration with the Eurozone 
might contribute to mitigating vulnerability against asymmetric shocks. 
                                                 
1University of Pannonia, Hungary, Email: halmai.peter@gtk.szie.hu 
2 University of Pannonia, Hungary, Email: vasary.viktoria@gtk.szie.hu 
3Analytically the projections are based on the statistical production function approach (Denis, McMorrow 
et al, 2006; Carone et al, 2006). In the Cobb-Douglas production function the potential GDP equals the 
product of the combination of the production factors and the total factor productivity.  230 
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Considering the special conditions of the NMSs, special attention needs to be paid 
to the risks related to convergence. Countries accumulating huge internal and external 
deficit are very vulnerable under the conditions of the present crisis. At the same time 
there has been a progressive price level convergence and real equilibrium appreciation as 
part of the process. On the other hand the catching up process of the NMSs is effected 
by globalization and financial integration. The NMSs are highly sensitive against shock 
impacts due to their relatively small size, high level of openness and greater need for 
external financing. These risks have become apparent during the current crisis. The 
retreat from risk and the search for liquidity by investors might contribute to heavy 
pressures on the financial markets of the NMSs. 
1.2. Price level and real convergence 
The majority of the NMSs achieved remarkable convergence (taking into account 
the advancement of macroeconomic stability and the supply side reforms related to EU-
accession). Nevertheless, a broad difference among certain member states remained. 
The new MSs have to face a shortfall caused by the crisis and sharp decline in growth 
(often accompanied by a decrease in GDP). Certain countries, which had a significant 
catch-up growth during the past years (e.g. the Baltic States) entered into a recession. 
Growth in the region has slowed down permanently. Therefore real convergence – 
within and outside the Eurozone – remains a determinant factor shaping the economic 
policy strategy for most NMSs in the medium term. 
The equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation (price level convergence) is considered a natural 
consequence of the economic catch-up (De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005)). Real exchange rate 
appreciation - depending on the monetary policy and exchange rate levels - might occur 
following two paths (or through the combination of the two): by nominal exchange rate 
appreciation and/or a higher internal (domestic) inflation. The pace and the channels of 
the equilibrium real appreciation are of great importance as regards the trajectory of 
nominal convergence. The fixed exchange rate system (which was introduced by the 
Baltic States) excludes the nominal exchange rate channel of the real appreciation. 
Therefore, higher trend inflation is evolving for converging economies than for the 
anchor area. 
Beyond the Balassa-Samuelson effect further factors effect significantly the 
dynamism of real appreciation. The pace of the income convergence, the domestic 
demand growth exceeding GDP growth and the exchange rate regime are significant 
determinants of the price level convergence dynamics. (Darvas and Szapáry (2008)). In 
the short term certain factors (e.g. the nominal exchange rate movements, the effect of 
the changes in the global resource and food prices) might temporarily deflect the 
inflation rates from the trends supporting price level convergence. (Certain structural 
factors – e.g. trade liberalization, boosting competition on the product markets, etc. – 
might have similar effects.) At the same time not all inflationary differences might be consistent 
with the need for ensuring competitiveness and external stability of the economy in the medium term. In 
certain NMSs the unsustainable domestic demand growth caused the high inflation. 
This process was fuelled through too optimistic future expectations of the economic 
agents and/or insufficient economic policies. 
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Figure 1. Catch-up and price level convergence in the NMSs 
 
Source: European Commission, 2009c. 
1.3. Financial integration and real convergence 
The growth dynamism in the NMSs was generally accompanied – sometimes 
controlled – by rapid financial deepening and credit expansion. The financial integration of the 
NMSs has advanced. The NMSs were able to mobilize their external savings to a great 
extent due to ongoing convergence and the high returns on investment. The short-term 
and the long term interest rates have been converging to the Eurozone level. (see Figure 
2) 
This interest rate convergence mirrored the preceding favourable global 
environment. On the other hand it showed that EU-accession resulted in increasing 
confidence. EU-accession and the prospect of joining the single currency mitigated 
significantly the risk premia. It provided strategy focus and at the same time, a 
protective screen for trustworthy economic policies. (There were no such factors in the 
other developing market economies.) In the new MSs the sovereign risk ratings kept 
improving before and after accession. Following the financial turmoil the risk perception 
increased more generally. 
There was higher capital inflow (including FDI) – expressed as a percentage of 
GDP - in MSs with tight pegs and currency boards (hereafter ‘fixers’) than in the 
floating currency countries. At the same time the fixed exchange rate regime resulted in 
a higher current account deficit. In the case of the ‘fixers’ the interest rate convergence 
was stronger. This process often led to negative real interest rates, especially in the case 
of strong inflation and rapid credit expansion. The ‘fixers’ started the real convergence 
process at a lower output level. Therefore the capital return was potentially higher that 232 
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in turn forced higher capital inflow during the earlier periods of catching up. (European 
Commission (2008a)) 
 
Figure 2. Real short-term interest rates in the new Member States 
 
Source: European Commission, 2009c. 
 
The rapid financial deepening and high capital inflow are considered a significant 
challenge to be faced during adaptation. (Darvas and Szapáry (2008)). The rapid credit 
expansion and the capital inflow in the non tradable sectors (especially housing) might 
change the composition of final demand. As a result a significant movement of the real 
exchange rate might come about. The real appreciation and the external deficit might become 
excessive due to unjustified optimistic expectations of the economic agents and 
insufficient economic policies. 
An ‘overshooting’ of the real exchange rate may hinder the achievement of fast and sustainable 
nominal convergence. It might cause further difficulties on the road towards the Euro. In 
the coming years painful macroeconomic corrections could be required due to the 
increasing deficit. The credit growth has slowed down under the circumstances of the 
global crisis. Liquidity conditions have become tighter. The risk perception of credit 
providers and credit takers has intensified. The financing conditions have become worse 
in those countries where high external and internal deficit has developed and foreign 
currency lending was significant. (e.g. Baltic States, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania.) 
Following EU enlargement in 2004, four new countries fulfilled the criteria 
required for the adoption of the Euro. The other counties mostly made some steps as Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
(Shorter and longer term prospects) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
233
regards the fulfilment of the nominal convergence criteria. Their economic structure got 
closer to that of the Eurozone, but there are significant differences among the MSs. 
NMS countries prepare themselves for euro adoption under very different 
conditions. It is of great importance to outline adequate national strategies. As a 
fundamental factor of these strategies the sustainability of the convergence should be ensured. 
Nominal convergence needs to be achieved and sustained by taking into account 
globalization and financial integration which are peculiarities of the environment. 
The main current challenge is the crisis management in countries with high 
domestic and external deficits. A well-balanced macroeconomic policy-mix and 
responsible wage policy is required to avoid painful macroeconomic corrections in the 
coming years. Strong financial supervision is needed and at the same time all counties 
should keep progressing towards convergence. 
The proper functioning of internal adjustment mechanism of economic policies 
and the focus on prudent macroeconomic aspects could ensure that NMSs take better 
advantage of the single currency. Flexible domestic production factors and product 
markets favour smooth adjustment to economic and financial shocks. The future 
members of the Eurozone have to push on with adequate fiscal and structural policies 
according to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Lisbon Program and beyond. 
2. Convergence and catching up 
Convergence and catch-up cannot be considered as an automatic result of EU-
accession. The catch-up processes of the MSs can be analysed methodologically by 
means of growth accounting, through a production function approach and the 
calculation and interpretation of the catch-up rate. 
The pace of catching-up and convergence are not identical concepts. Both 
concepts may be interpreted in a negative light. However, their dynamics are not 
identical: catching-up is the distance to be travelled, while convergence expresses the measure 
of progress. Consequently, in the context of growth, the extent of the catch-up will be 
greater in the case of a narrower residual difference, while the measure of convergence 
shall accordingly be lower. 
  The convergence in the EU during the past decades showed a relatively steady 
pace. The inverse relationship between growth and the level of income is considered β-
convergence. If this factor is present, poorer countries get closer to the richer ones. The β-
convergence ratio depends on the economic policy and other country-specific factors. It 
indicates how long convergence will take place (see Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992)). The 
pace of β-convergence was 2,1-2,3% among countries over the period 1960-2003. The pace 
of β-convergence in the EU-27 during the half decade prior to accession (1999-2003) 
was annually 2,3% and increased to 3,4% between 2004 and 2008 (European 
Commission, (2009c)). The growth in the new Member States with lower income was 
faster than in the old Member States. The catch-up process accelerated after the accession. It is 
an essential question whether this accelerated process is sustainable or not (see below). 
  The convergence among regions seems to be faster. The caution is, however, 
justified: on the one hand the pace of convergence might be very different in certain 
countries and periods, on the other hand the method applied to quantify the above 
mentioned indicators could cause distortion. 234 
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 The  economic integration favoured only a limited number of regions, especially at the outset. 
Among these are the most dynamic and innovative regions of certain countries that 
could be mostly favoured through potential externalities produced in the entire EU-
economy (Gianetti (2002)). As a result the convergence increases at country level, 
however that increase is driven only by a few regions. At the same time the level of 
GDP per capita might move further apart within countries. This conclusion is very 
important for the new Member States where the disparities of GDP per capita within 
countries are higher presently than the disparities in earlier periods of the development 
in the EU-15. It is possible for internal disparities to grow – at least temporarily – as country level 
convergence progresses. 
2.1. Main trends in catching up in the new EU Member States 
The pace of catching-up is expressed by the catch-up rate,
4 as follows: 
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where y is the level of GDP per capita at purchasing power standard for country i 
at time t; 
*
t y  is the average of yt t for the EU-25; ∆ indicates the difference between t and 
t-1, where  
*
t y  is the weighted average of the EU-25. 
In the case of negative catch-up rates the disparity between the country concerned 
and the EU average decreases, while the positive catch-up rate shows the increase of 
this difference. 
                                                 
4 The catch-up rate is calculated by means of the historical actual growth rate. It gives a framework for ex-
post analysis of the catch-up dynamism. At the same time future projection shall be based on the 
potential growth rate. The authors shall render thanks to Hubert Gabrisch and the anonymous reviewer 
for their important methodological remarks which are considered to be relevant as regards the future 
research work.  Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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Table 1. Average catch-up rates2 - EU-101 (% per year)  
   1991-1994  1995-1998  1999-2003  2004-2008  1991-2008 
EU-10 average 3  0,43  -1,79  -1,66  -2,92  -1,56 
Czech Republic  1,04  0,71  -1,89  -6,60  -1,69 
Estonia 0,62  -2,44  -4,31 -4,53 -2,86 
Hungary  0,88  -0,86  -4,54  0,60  -1,09 
Lithuania  16,00 -2,56 -2,39 -4,47 1,08 
Latvia  14,84  -1,21  -2,98  -4,42  0,97 
Poland  -1,53 -2,55 -0,48 -2,19 -1,65 
Slovakia  -2,33  -2,08  -1,41  -6,58  -3,20 
Slovenia 0,36  -3,64  -4,23 -7,10 -3,88 
Malta  -6,34  0,57  2,07  1,15  -0,39 
Cyprus -5,18  -3,36  -2,79 -1,20 -3,01 
Source: calculated by authors based on Eurostat data. 
1).  EU-10: Countries which joined the EU in 2004.  2). The negative catch-up rate indicates the reduction in the 
GDP gap compared to average GDP per capita of the EU-25, and the positive catch-up rate shows the pace of growth of the 
rate.  3). Weighted against the population of the countries concerned. 
 
The average catch-up rate in the EU-10 countries for the period of 1991-2008 was 1.56%. 
Above-average catch-up rates for the entire period were seen in Slovenia, Estonia, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Poland’s rate was average, while Latvia, Lithuania and 
Hungary came in below the average. (Table 1) 
The effect of the transformation recession is striking, particularly in 1991-1994, 
and especially in Latvia and Lithuania. After 1994, catch-up (i.e. a negative catch-up rate) is 
observed in the EU-8 countries. (With the sole exception of the Czech Republic between 
1995 and 1998.) The annual catch-up rate in the EU-10 was approximately 1,7% in 
1999-2003. The best performance in this period was achieved by Hungary with a figure 
of 4,5%. A rate of above 4% was also attained by Estonia and almost by Slovenia too. 
From the year of accession to 2008 and on average for the EU-10 – except for 
Hungary and Malta – all the countries experienced significant growth in the catch-up rate, with 
the average rate nearly doubled compared to the previous five years. Exceptional catch-
up rates were displayed by Slovenia, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in the years studied. 
Compared to the trends of previous years, one fundamental change was the halt in 
the Hungarian catch-up process from 2004. In Hungary's case, as a result of the 
macroeconomic (especially equilibrium) difficulties as well as the coerced stabilization 
program launched in the autumn of 2006, there has essentially been no catch-up in GDP per 
capita since accession. The trends of recent years have really put the brakes on the catch-up 
rate for the entire period under review. For Hungary the average annual catch-up rate 236 
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totalled 1,09% between 1991 and 2008. At the same time, within this period – between 
1995 and 2003 – the catch-up rate approximated 3% per annum. 
Against the methodological problems the σ-convergence
5 can be examined if the 
results are treated cautiously. According to the European Commission’s examination the 
disparities are much larger if the new Member States are taken into account too 
(European Commission (2004)). The average annual fluctuation of the three 
convergence indicators shows that the disparities of the per capita GDP in the EU are 
narrowing. The pace of catch-up is enhancing compared to previous periods, especially 
at regional level, but the initial level of regional disparities is much higher. 
The regional disparities decreased essentially due to the decrease in disparities 
among countries. The disparities within countries increased by 2,4-2,6% depending on 
the applied indicators. It strengthens the results for the EU-15: there is a certain degree 
of convergence to be observed at country and regional level in the whole EU-27, but 
the disparities within countries are increasing (or might increase). 
The income dispersion in the enlarged EU remained largely the same during the 
period of 10 years between 1999 and 2008. This dispersion (Luxembourg is excluded) 
decreased (European Commission, (2009c)). The income equality was due to 
diminishing disparities among the new Member States. Therefore, two dimensions need 
to be highlighted. On the one hand, the new Member States were catching-up in relative 
terms during the half decade following the accession. On the other hand, the absolute 
income inequalities decreased, too. 
The convergence over the past decade is depicted – as a simple regression - in 
Figure 3. (In Figure 3 data for the USA, Japan, Norway and Switzerland can also be 
seen.) 
To benchmark the catch-up performances in a more sophisticated way the 
extended neoclassical growth theory needs to be applied. According to this framework, 
growth depends on the relationship between the initial output (y) of a country 
considered and its steady-state level (y*). The latter depends highly on savings, work 
supply (related to households’ savings) government policies and institutional factors. As 
for certain determinants of y*, the growth rate changes inversely with y (conditional 
convergence), while in the case of a given y, growth varies directly with y*. Actually, the 
change in the steady-state income explains the acceleration of the catch-up process in 
certain countries and the slowdown in others. Government policies affecting growth 
include fiscal policies (tax mix, composition of public expenditures) and institutional 
choices. (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, (1992)(1995); Chalk and Tanzi, (2002)). Therefore 
growth might be relatively sluggish, even if the initial level of output is low and the 
steady-state output level is low, as well. 
                                                 
5The development of the per capita GDP disparity - differences between absolute income - is to be 
measured as σ-convergence, i.e. through the change in the fluctuation around the average per capita 
GDP.  Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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Figure 3. Convergence trend (1999-2008) 
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Source: European Commission, 2008a. 
 
Figure 3 clearly emphasizes the disparities between the catch-up performances. 
Exceptional growth is recorded in the Baltic countries as well as in Ireland, and in the 
development of certain ‘Nordic’ Member States carrying out bold structural reforms 
(Sweden, Finland). Nonetheless, unfavourable dynamics are observed in Portugal, Malta 
and Cyprus, as well as in the larger continental Member States. 
2.2. Quality of the catch-up and real convergence: sustainable 
convergence? 
The faster growth in the NMSs after EU-accession was based mainly on faster 
domestic demand growth. (Table 2) 
After the enlargement the dominant factors of the domestic demand growth were 
private consumption and the gross fixed capital formation. The government consumption 
growth was, however, somewhat more moderate. At the same time import usually grew 
to a greater extent than export in the NMSs. 
The gross fixed capital formation increased also in the EU-15. As the dynamics of 
the private and public consumption growth mitigated in these counties the dominant 
demand-side factors of the economic growth were increasing investments and exports. 
Among the NMSs the Baltic States had the highest economic growth in the half 
decade preceding the enlargement. In the years after enlargement (5 years) Slovakia 
became one of the countries with the most dynamic growth performance. The 
contribution of the domestic demand to the growth exceeded the annual average 6% in 
three countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia). In four other countries (Poland, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia) the contribution of the domestic demand growth reached the 
indicated share after the accession. Before accession the net export contributed to the 
growth only in Cyprus, Poland and Slovenia, after accession the Czech Republic and 
Hungary could be added to the above mentioned group. 238 
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Table 2. GDP growth and its main demand factors 
New Member States  Old Member States  Annual average change 
as percentage (fixed 
prices)  1999-2003 2004-2008  1999-2003  2004-2008 
GDP  3,4  5,6  2,2  2,2 
private consumption  4,0  5,5  2,5  1,7 
public consumption  3,1  2,3  2,2  1,8 
gross fixed capital 
formation  2,0 10,2  2,3  3,4 
export  8,7  11,8  4,8  5,7 
import 7,9  12,4  5,0  5,6 
contribution to the GDP 
growth       
domestic demand  3,4  6,4  2,2  2,1 
net export  0,0  -0,8  0,0  0,1 
Source: European Commission, 2009a. 
 
In the Baltic States and the new Balkan MSs the growth based on domestic 
demand was dominant. At the same time after accession in certain Central European 
Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) the demand structure of growth was 
more rebalanced. 
The output gap in the EU-27 in the period 2004-2008 reached 1,4% of the GDP. 
In the old MSs the positive output gap narrowed at the outset while the negative output 
gap in the new MSs switched to a great positive difference (over 3%)
6. 
                                                 
6Own calculation, based on the database of the EPC Output Gap Working Group.  Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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The catch-up process was partly based on exuberant demand. The process was financed 
through cheap credit. At the same time notable current account deficit arose in the 
countries concerned. The growth as a basis of catching up outpaced the supply potential 
of the economy. 
This dynamics was not considered sustainable. In 2008 a strong growth correction was 
launched. The real convergence prospects have deteriorated drastically due to the global crisis and 
the accumulated macroeconomic equilibrium problems. 
There has been a deep recession in the NMSs mostly as a consequence of the 
crisis. The national economic performances have declined significantly. In order to 
stimulate real convergence and the catch-up process' macroeconomic equilibrium, 
investments increasing the productivity and growth based on highly educated workforce 
are required. Precondition of the sustainable dynamism and the sustainable convergence is 
the simultaneous fulfilment of these criteria. 
3. Longer term prospects of the real convergence. Divergence instead of 
convergence 
Due to the severe structural productivity problems of the EU-15 and the 
insufficient adjustment to globalization a permanent and significant decline in the 
potential growth rate is to be expected (see European Commission (2006), Carone et al 
(2006) etc.). The unfavourable investment environment promotes a higher level of 
capital outflow and a notable increase in the share of imported products and services. 
Applying the production function approach the longer-term simulations indicate that 
the potential growth rate both in the EU-15 and the EU-27 falls
7  (European 
Commission (2006), (2008b), (2009b)). This reduction will be continuous, moving from 
an annual 2,4% in 2004-2020 to an average 1,7% in 2021-2030 and then down to 1,3% 
in 2031-2060. The decline in the potential rate of growth that is to be expected is far greater in the 
EU-10 and EU-12 countries than in the EU-15 states. Output in the EU-12 between 2007 
and 2030 will expand far more rapidly than in the EU-15 countries, i.e. the convergence 
process will continue. But as time passes the pace of convergence will slow down, and 
then stop after 2030. (Based on the simulations, annual GDP in the EU-10 will grow by 
only 0,6% in 2041-2060, compared to a figure of 1,5% for the EU-15 countries.
8 That is, 
there is a switch from convergence to divergence, see Table 3.) 
                                                 
7In this section we used the quantitative analysis - based on the production functions - that was carried 
out for the European Commission. (See European Commission (2006), (2008b), (2009b); Carone et al 
(2006); Denis et al (2006).  
8The average growth rate in the EU-12 is expected to be 2,6% in 2020, 1,8% in 2030, 1,2% in 2035, 0,8% 
in 2040, 0,6% in 2045 and 0,4% in 2050. 240 
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Table 3. Potential GDP growth rate (annual average as percentage) 
 2007-2020  2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2051-2060 2007-2060 
CZ  4,0 1,7 1,1 0,8 0,9 1,8 
HU  2,9  2,1  1,5  0,9  0,9  1,7 
PL  4,3 2,3 1,0 0,3 0,4 1,7 
Sl  3,7  1,4  0,8  0,7  1,0  1,6 
SK  5,3 2,3 0,9 0,3 0,4 2,0 
RO  4,9  2,1  1,6  0,6  0,4  2,0 
EU-  27  2,4 1,7 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,7 
EU- 15  2,2  1,7  1,5  1,5  1,5  1,7 
EU-  10  4,2 2,1 1,1 0,6 0,6 1,8 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on European Commission, 2008b. 
 
In the EU-12 countries, demographic developments
9 are likely to be a particularly 
important factor in the decline of the potential growth rate. According to the forecasts 
the  labour input might grow until 2010. Afterwards the working age population is 
expected to decline significantly, in the long run by about one third. In the EU-12 the 
working age population will decrease by 37% according to the forecast. It will be an 
important factor in the decrease of the potential growth rate. 
The increases in productivity per worker are converging between the EU-15 and 
EU-10 countries. In the long run one is likely to see an average productivity growth rate 
of 1,7%, which - in the case of the EU-12 - constitutes a substantial slowdown of more 
than 50% over approximately three decades. (Table 4) 
The majority of productivity growth per worker is attributable to total factor 
productivity (TFP). In the long run, the increase in TFP will be followed by capital 
deepening. According to an analysis of long-term development, total factor productivity 
growth may converge between the EU-15 and EU-12 countries at an annual rate of 
1,1%. This enables a 1,7% increase in labour productivity per year, which in the long 
run will also converge between Member States (European Commission (2008b): 101). 
In the EU-15 the contribution of capital deepening to the productivity growth will be 
average averagely 0,6% of the GDP in the long run. In the case of the EU-12 countries 
this contribution between 2004 and 2020 will be roughly 1,6% each year. This high rate 
is one of the indicators of convergence. Later on such contribution will gradually fall to 
0,6%, the level of long-term growth in the EU-15. Based on these developments, 
productivity per worker in the countries of the EU-10 will rise to 83% of the level 
recorded in the EU-15 states by 2050. 
                                                 
9These developments are discussed in detail by the „Ageing Report”. European Commission, (2009b). Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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Table 4. Labour productivity (annual average growth rate as percentage)  
 2007-2020  2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2051-2060  2007-2060
CZ 3,6 2,2 1,7 1,7 1,7 2,2 
HU  2,8  2,6  2,3  1,9  1,7  2,3 
PL 3,4 2,8 1,9 1,7 1,7 2,4 
Sl  3,4  2,3  1,7  1,7  1,7  2,2 
SK 4,5 2,9 1,9 1,7 1,7 2,6 
RO  4,6  3,0  2,7  2,0  1,7  2,9 
EU-27  1,9 2,0 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,8 
EU-15  1,6  1,8  1,7  1,7  1,7  1,7 
EU-10  3,4 2,7 1,9 1,7 1,7 2,4 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on European Commission, 2008b. 
Note: labour productivity per hour. 
 
Changes in total factor productivity are of crucial importance both in terms of 
long-term economic growth and convergence. In comparison to the annual average over 
several decades indicated above (1,1%) the growth of total factor productivity in most 
countries of the EU-15 has fallen since 1990 and grown by only 0,8% each year. If we 
base our projections on this slower growth, then the long-term growth prospects are substantially worse 
than those presented in the baseline scenario. 
The decrease in the per capita GDP growth rate is more moderate than the 
decline in the dynamics of total output in the period studied, as the EU population is 
diminishing in the long term. 
GDP per capita in the EU-10 and EU-12 countries compared to the EU-15 shall 
catch up significantly in the coming two decades. Later the convergence may come to a 
halt, and by the end of the period under review the GDP per capita in the EU-10 and 
EU-12 countries may fall somewhat compared to the EU-15. The estimated dynamics 242 
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of per capita GDP are based on the productivity growth of the country-group 
concerned. 
Besides these tendencies the growth rate might differ country by country. It can be 
explained – especially in the first half of the period examined – through the different 
productivity dynamics of the countries. (A major factor of that is considered the catch-
up potential of the countries.) In the second half of this period the development of 
demographic factors and labour input will be of great importance. (The projection 
assumes the convergence of the productivity dynamics in the longer run.) 
Besides the declining potential of the GDP growth rate the growth sources are 
changing dynamically. The labour factor will contribute to the potential growth 
positively until 2020 afterwards this impact will become significantly negative. The 
productivity growth is determinant at the outset, later on it becomes, however, the 
exclusive source of growth. 
According to the scenarios based on the production function, the per capita GDP 
calculated in PPS has been growing at the greatest pace in MSs with the lowest GDP 
(Bulgaria and Romania). (It is more than three and half times higher than it was in 
2007.) The simulation shows a high dynamics also in the case of the Baltic States. 
Among the new MSs Estonia and Cyprus were expected to catch-up totally to the 
average per capita GDP (in PPS) of the EU-27. Slovenia and Slovakia are expected to 
exceed and the Czech Republic is expected to approach the EU-27 average. Later on, 
however, the indicator will drop below this average in all three MSs. By the end of the 
period examined it will reach only 92-94% of the EU average. 
The per capita GDP of Latvia, Lithuania and Malta will reach 86-90% of the EU-
27 average from 2030 onwards, but later on it will decline to 77-83% of the average. 
Hungary, Poland and Portugal – the latter not among those countries which have joined 
the EU in the recent accession rounds - are expected to be found at this level, in the 
‘convergence club’. 
In the case of Hungary the per capita GDP will reach its relatively highest level in 
2045 (79,6% of the EU-27 average), in the coming one and half decade this rate will 
decline by about 3%. In Poland the highest rate (74%) might be reached in 2035, and 
during the one and half decade afterwards it might drop to 66%. 
At the end of the period examined Bulgaria and Romania will reach 59-62% of 
the EU-27 average even despite the significant catch up. 
Consequently the full convergence of the income level calculated in PPS might be taken into 
account in only 2 smaller MSs also in the long run. The main scenario implies persistent 
disparity in income, the potential development of the ‘convergence clubs’  with 90%, 70-80%, 59-
62% of the EU-27 average in the long run (Table 5 and Table 6). Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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Table 5. Per capita GDP in the cohesion countries in the long run (in PPS) 
GDP in 
PPS 
2007=100 
2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
BG  100  144,4 168,7 217,5 272,8 312,9 358,0 
CZ  100  133,6  152,8  182,6  208,3  233,0  266,9 
EE  100  145,2 166,5 209,0 259,3 279,6 332,4 
IE  100  113,1  124,2  146,7  171,1  191,2  218,1 
EL  100  123,9 139,7 167,4 187,4 212,3 249,1 
ES  100  113,6  128,3  158,4  178,3  195,5  229,5 
CY  100  119,1 129,2 161,3 190,6 215,0 256,4 
LV  100  151,3  170,7  227,1  265,2  284,5  317,5 
LT  100  150,9 179,9 222,1 259,2 291,0 322,5 
HU  100  127,7  146,3  183,7  219,6  248,9  285,2 
MT  100  122,2 140,7 172,2 198,1 218,5 238,9 
PL  100  139,0  159,2  205,7  239,1  261,6  290,1 
PT  100  113,0 122,8 148,8 181,0 211,8 243,7 
RO  100  150,7  179,4  229,3  281,2  316,0  353,8 
Sl  100  126,5 145,0 175,5 189,3 214,6 249,1 
SK  100  151,8  182,1  232,6  264,1  283,4  319,9 
         
EU-27  100  117,7  129,3  152,0  174,9  201,2  234,3 
EA-16  100  114,8 125,8 146,0 165,9 190,0 222,3 
Note: own calculation based on the quantitative analysis of the Ageing Report. 244 
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Table 6. Development of the level of per capita GDP in the cohesion countries in the long run (in PPS) 
GDP in 
PPS 
EU27=100 
2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
BG  38,3 47,0 50,0 54,8 59,7 59,6 58,5 
CZ  81,5  92,5  96,2  97,9  97,0  94,3  92,8 
EE  72,2 89,0 92,9 99,3 107,0  100,3  102,4 
IE  146,4  140,7  140,6  141,3  143,2  139,1  136,2 
EL  98,0  103,2 105,8 107,9 104,9 103,4 104,2 
ES  106,9  103,1  106,0  111,4  108,9  103,8  104,7 
CY  92,7 93,8 92,7 98,4 101,0  99,1 101,5 
LV  58,1  74,7  76,7  86,8  88,0  82,1  78,7 
LT  60,5 77,5 84,1 88,4 89,6 87,5 83,3 
HU  63,3  68,7  71,6  76,5  79,5  78,3  77,1 
MT  77,0 80,0 83,8 87,3 87,2 83,7 78,5 
PL  53,6  63,3  66,0  72,6  73,3  69,7  66,4 
PT  74,6 71,6 70,8 73,1 77,2 78,5 77,6 
RO  40,7  52,2  56,5  61,4  65,5  64,0  61,5 
Sl  88,7 95,4 99,4 102,5  96,0 94,6 94,3 
SK  68,5  88,4  96,5  104,9  103,5  96,6  93,6 
         
EU-27  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
EA-16  110,1 107,4 107,0 105,8 104,4 104,0 104,4 
Note: own calculation based on the quantitative analysis of the Ageing Report. Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
(Shorter and longer term prospects) 
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Summarizing: according to the simulations the annual potential growth rate of 
2,4% in the EU-27 in 2007-2020 is expected to decrease to 1,3% after 2040. In the new 
MSs the potential growth rate will decline at a greater pace, thus the real convergence 
will stop from 2030 onwards and even a moderate divergence from the EU-15 might occur. It can 
be explained by the following factors: on the one hand the productivity growth rate 
might be rebalanced by 2050, on the other hand the demographic forecast are 
significantly more unfavourable in the NMSs than in the old ones. Nota bene: labour 
productivity and employment depend on several factors and the simulation took the 
most likely scenario as a basis. 
4. Crisis, potential growth, prospects 
4.1 Growing risks, slowing growth, convergence-crisis 
The financial and economic crisis started in 2008 caused an extraordinarily rapid 
decline in the economic performances. The slow-down has gradually become a global 
recession. This hit especially the USA and the EU. New risks have emerged, which will 
burden the economic activities in the future, too. The recovery of the economy is 
expected to be drawn out. 
It is a real risk that weak potential growth performance and slow recovery can be expected in 
that prolonged period. The following main reasons explain that: 
Fundamental lack of confidence which leads to the postponement of household 
consumption and effective entrepreneurial investments. 
Real economy effects of balance sheet adjustment in the financial sector; 
downsizing of banks' assets including writing off ‘impaired’ or ‘toxic’ assets, increases the 
cost of capital also despite large recapitalisation packages; 
Pervasive credit constraints and higher borrowing costs in the non-financial sector 
simultaneously with the restructuring of banks; (in the EU deleveraging needs for 
households are generally lower than in the US, but firms are more heavily indebted 
there. At the same time the persistent credit squeeze was one of the key factors of the 
relative Japanese slump recorded in the last two decades); 
A persistent impact on the EU's growth potential might occur if an attitude to risk 
and a higher cost of capital dominates; 
Slower growth in TFP in the short and medium terms, induced by the reduction in 
ICT and knowledge-based investment such as R&D. The postponement of key 
innovation-prone investments may have a lasting effect on productivity and growth; 
Permanent destruction in human capital due to an increase in structural unemployment 
rate (NAIRU) induced by a protracted recession. (This permanent negative effect in 
terms of ‘knowhow’ or professional knowledge is often called ‘hysteresis’ effect (See 
Blanchard and Summers, 1989); 
The collapse of world trade and the drastic fall in import demand pose risks for a 
higher degree of protectionism. (European Commission, 2009b) 
Taking all these risks and threats into account more negative growth prospects can be 
observed than it was outlined previously (section 3). 246 
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This is confirmed also by the mid-term simulations.
10 In 2009-2010 the potential growth 
rate will decrease to about half of the level which was reached during the previous years 
(to an annual 0,7-0,8%. From 2011 onwards it will increase again to an annual level of 
1,5%. The countries which have joined the EU lately, however, have been facing a 
persistent and continuous decrease in potential growth. The impact of the crisis is 
shown through the development of capital accumulation and Total Factor Productivity. 
(Figure 4) 
 
Figure 4. Potential growth in the new MSs (annual change, %) 
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Source: based on the database of the EPC Output Gap Working Group. 
 
The decrease in the dynamics of the potential output to be predicted for the 
coming years in certain EU-Member States is considered to be dramatic (See Figure 5). 
The potential output growth in the Baltic States will drop from an annual 5-6% to about 
1-2%. In Hungary the annual dynamics of 3-4% might fall below 1% per year. In certain 
new MSs the real convergence might stop also in the short run and it might even come 
to a divergence compared to the more developed countries. This convergence-crisis might 
cause severe tensions both in the MSs affected and the EU as a whole during the 
indicated mid-term. 
. 
                                                 
10The analysis is based on the database calculated according to the production function methodology of 
the EPC Output Gap Working Group.  Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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Figure 5. Potential growth in the EU Member States 
 
 
Source: based on the database of the EPC Output Gap Working Group and the AMECO database. 
 
5. Financial crisis, potential growth, shock-scenarios 
The financial crisis causes lower contribution of labour and capital formation to 
the growth and results in unfavourable TPF. The longer-term labour market trends (e.g. 
the unfavourable dynamics of the working age population) affect negatively the 
potential growth rate. The recession intensifies these negative impacts. 
The mid-term simulations based on the production functions indicate the increase 
in structural unemployment. According to the simulations 1% increase in the Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) results in a decrease of 0,6% in the potential growth rate 
(European Commission (2009a)). 
Due to the financial disturbances the investment trends deteriorate severely. A 
decline of 2-3% expressed as a percentage of the GDP decreases the potential growth rate by further 
0,2-0,3% in the countries concerned. 
As a result of the unfavourable effects the contribution of the TFP to growth 
declines by about 0,1% a year. The TPF-assumptions are conservative: these 
assumptions don’t take into account the one-off downward change to be expected in 
the TPF level and the development of the potential output related to the structural 
change in a sector. The performance of certain sectors e.g. financial services, car 
production etc. is likely to decline due to the crisis. 
Empirically it is to be proved, that a financial crisis might coexist with drawn-out or 
permanent output decline. According to empirical researches a significant decrease in the 
potential growth rate was to be observed together with the extended bank and financial 
crisis (Cerra, Saxena et al. (2008), Haugh et al. (2009)). According to experiences gained 
in certain countries (Japan, Finland, Sweden) at the beginning of the 1990s, the financial 
shock causes a significant decline in the potential growth rate. This process is led by 
permanent increase in unemployment and fall in the investment rate. 
2009-2013 (%) 
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Factors of downward pressure on investments: 
•  increase in risk premia calculated for entrepreneurial and household 
credits; 
•  correction towards the ‘normal’ rate of the investment level, which 
evolves following the excessive investment rate of the boom period 
(generated by the financial and housing bubbles). 
Simulations carried out using the Quest model (see Ratto – Roeger – in’t Veld 
(2008)) confirm the negative effects of the adjustment disturbances on the labour and 
product markets, the nominal stiffness and the higher structural unemployment on potential 
growth. The simulations show the function failure of the labour market, they show that 
there is no nominal wage adjustment after the crisis. This nominal stiffness might result 
in the decrease in employment and the increase in structural unemployment. 
In order to calculate the impact of the current crisis, alternative scenarios need to 
be set up. In view of the large uncertainty regarding the length of the slump in economic 
activity the case of the temporary shock and the case of the permanent shock needs to 
be defined. 
Two temporary shock scenarios can be described: a 'lost decade' and a 'rebound' 
scenario. These scenarios consider potential growth i.e. they are based on the supply-side 
factors. They do not take into account the actual growth, or those that are affected by 
business cycles.
11 Those figures are much lower than the baseline projection for the 
period until 2013. Therefore the annual potential GDP growth in the EU-27 included in 
the latest analysis carried out by the European Commission is lower by around -0,9% in 
both scenarios than in the baseline scenario. 
The potential growth components will then converge to reach the growth rate 
projected in the baseline: 
•  in the 'lost decade' scenario, labour productivity is assumed to reach the 
baseline growth rate in 2020. Labour input is assumed to reach the 
baseline growth rate in 2020, too. 
•  in the 'rebound' scenario, labour productivity and labour input are expected 
to reach the baseline level in 2020. 
Given the current economic crisis and a very considerable degree of uncertainty, 
the impact of a permanently worse situation of the growth potential can also be 
analysed. This is the 'permanent shock' scenario.
12 
According to the permanent shock scenario from 2014 to 2020 the labour 
productivity growth and labour input growth will reach the baseline figures, but the 
unemployment rate will be permanently 1% higher than in the baseline from 2020 
                                                 
11In the short term, the projections are based upon the Forecast carried out by the European 
Commission in January 2009 up to 2010, in the medium term the projections are extended until 2013 
with the EPC Output Gap Working Group method that extrapolates the trends for the components of 
potential GDP. 
12It requires sensitivity scenarios embedded in the long-term projection exercise.  Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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onwards; and the labour productivity growth rate will be 0,25% lower than that from 
2020 onwards. 
The 'lost decade scenario' causes a reduction in the per-capita GDP level by the end 
of the period examined compared with the baseline. It implies a lower expected potential 
growth up to 2020. This period is 'lost' in terms of accumulated wealth creation. The loss 
in GDP per capita in the EU-27 is around 8% in 2020. This scenario carries over the 
loss in the rest of the projection period. The growth projection remains broadly 
unchanged between 2020 and 2060. In the 'rebound' scenario, the GDP per capita by 2060 
is the same as in the baseline (the deterioration relative to the baseline up to 2014 is 
offset by the improvement between 2015 and 2020) (European Commission, 2009b). 
A more marked reduction in the GDP per capita level occurs in the ‘permanent shock’ scenario. 
(The difference of this scenario from the baseline outlined in section 3 – expressed as 
annual average GDP growth rate – is indicated in table 7). In that case the GDP per 
capita is 10% lower than in the baseline in 2020, 14% lower in 2040 and 18% lower in 
2060. It means that this scenario reflects significantly lower growth throughout the 
projection period than it was assumed before. (The growth path of the different 
variables is summarized in Figure 6.) 
 
Table 7. Potential growth loss in the ‘permanent shock’ scenario - Annual average GDP growth rate, 
negative difference from the baseline  
  2007-2010 2011-2020 2021-2040 2041-2060 2007-2060 
BG  0,1 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,3 
CZ  0,4  0,2  0,3  0,2  0,2 
EE  2,4 1,5 0,3 0,2 0,6 
LV  3,6  1,6  0,3  0,2  0,7 
LT  2,3 1,8 0,3 0,2 0,7 
HU  1,6  1,6  0,3  0,2  0,6 
PL  0,9 1,0 0,2 0,2 0,4 
RO  1,2  1,2  0,3  0,2  0,5 
Sl 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,2 0,2 
SK  0,6  0,1  0,3  0,2  0,2 
EA  0,7 0,7 0,2 0,2 0,4 
EU-27  0,8  0,7  0,2  0,2  0,4 
EU-10  1,0 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,4 
EU-25  0,7  0,7  0,2  0,2  0,4 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the database of the Ageing Report, European Commission (2009b). 
Note: Discussed in section 3. 250 
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Figure 6. Potential GDP growth under different shocks (annual growth rate) 
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Source: European Commission, 2009b. 
 
The permanent shocks would result in the complete collapse of the growth and 
catch-up models in Europe. In the long term one fifth of the GDP would fall out and 
the chances of real convergence would deteriorate dramatically, though differently 
country by country. 
6. Some conclusions 
1)  An ‘overshooting’ of the real exchange rate may hinder the achievement of fast 
and sustainable nominal convergence. In the coming years painful macroeconomic 
corrections could be required due to increasing deficit. The credit growth has 
slowed down under the circumstances of the global crisis. The financing conditions 
have become worse in those countries where high external and internal deficit has 
developed and the foreign currency lending was significant.   
The simultaneous sustainability of the nominal and real convergence is of great importance. On 
the one hand a well-balanced macroeconomic policy-mix, responsible wage policy 
and strong financial supervision are required. On the other hand the flexible 
domestic production factors and product markets favour the smooth adjustment to 
economic and financial shocks. In the case of the lack of certain conditions (e.g. 
nominal stiffness) economic growth might stay for a longer period at a low level. 
Consequently real convergence might stop and even change direction. 
2)  The fulfilment of the nominal convergence criteria per se is not enough to ensure 
a robust long term economic performance in the monetary union. Therefore, the 
promotion of fiscal and structural policies is required also in the course of the euro-
adoption. (Together with compliance with rules of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP)). As basic condition for real economic convergence the structure of the economies 
has to become similar. This process might be promoted also by transfers of the 
cohesion policy. This way the risk of asymmetric shocks among certain economies 
might be mitigated, the synchronization of business cycles might be strengthened, 
and the Eurozone might get closer to the fulfilment of the criteria of the optimum 
currency area. Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Real convergence in the new Member States of the European Union 
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3)  Catch-up and convergence is based on economic growth. At the same time - in relation with 
challenges of globalisation and competitiveness problems of the European Union’s 
economy - the current average annual rate of potential growth in the European Union of 
2,4% could fall to half this level on average in the coming decades. The potential growth rate 
will be cut in half, despite the prognosis containing relatively benign development 
in labour productivity. This may also indicate adverse demographic changes.   
Since accession the new Member States have been following transition paths 
leading to substantial convergence. Yet the pace of this catch up will dwindle over time and 
may eventually stop. The growth in these countries might be more moderate in three 
decades than the average of the EU-15 at that time.  It is possible that the 
convergence of the new Member States will reach around three-quarters of the per 
capita GDP level of the EU-15, i.e. after the rapid initial convergence the EU-10 
countries will increasingly constitute a stagnating ‘convergence club’. 
4)  The present global crisis resulted in the deepest recession we have seen since 
WWII. New risks appeared. The new MSs have been experiencing a continuous fall 
in potential growth since 2008. The potential decrease in the dynamics of the 
potential growth in the medium term is of dramatic size in certain new MSs. In 
these countries real convergence might stop in the short run and it might even come to a 
divergence. We call it ‘convergence crisis’. 
5)  The risk of shock repetition is high. These changes project further erosion of the 
growth potential in Europe. That is: due to the crisis and its potential long-term impacts 
there might be scenarios which are more unfavourable than those indicating 
decreasing potential growth in the previous point. The trajectory of the permanent shocks 
threatens with the complete collapse of the European growth and catch-up model. 
6)  The above mentioned projections assume that there are no changes in the policies 
of the EU member states. Comprehensive, integrated structural reforms (Lisbon-type 
reforms) could provide an opportunity to overcome these adverse developments and 
achieve  higher growth than above and enlarge the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Consistently implementing these reforms will facilitate a renewal of the European 
model and thus a better outcome to convergence processes. Fulfilment of the set 
goals depends to a not insignificant extent on convergence within Europe. The 
more developed EU Member States took the Lisbon process as their own from the 
very beginning. But the new EU members are very important factors in this 
framework. The successful convergence of the new Member States which implies far-reaching 
reforms is a major prerequisite to the successful development of European integration. 
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